Technology and technical knowledge in the debate about the “great divergence” by Popplow, Marcus
 
Artefact
Techniques, histoire et sciences humaines 
4 | 2016
L’Europe technicienne, XVe-XVIIIe siècle
Technology and technical knowledge in the debate







Association Artefact. Techniques histoire et sciences humaines, Presses universitaires du Midi
Printed version
Date of publication: 1 October 2016





Marcus Popplow, « Technology and technical knowledge in the debate about the “great divergence” », 
Artefact [Online], 4 | 2016, Online since 07 July 2017, connection on 19 April 2019. URL : http://
journals.openedition.org/artefact/485  ; DOI : 10.4000/artefact.485 
Artefact. Techniques, histoire et sciences humaines
275
Technology and technical knowledge 




À la recherche des raisons pour lesquelles l’industrialisation apparaît d’abord en 
Europe plutôt que dans d’autres régions du monde, la technologie est souvent consi-
dérée comme un facteur prépondérant. Pourtant, les comparaisons restent souvent 
centrées sur les inventions spectaculaires et les performances quantifiables, perpé-
tuant ainsi des catégories européocentrées. Cet article critique cette perspective de la 
recherche. En s’intéressant au problème du savoir technique, il propose d’enquêter 
sur les multiples aspects de l’expertise technique quelles que soient les régions du 
monde, plutôt que de poursuivre dans la perspective traditionnelle de l’application 
de la « science » aux problèmes techniques.
Mots-clés: expertise, européocentrisme, Grande Divergence, industrialisation, savoir 
technique, science appliquée, technologie.
Abstract
In the search for reasons why industrialization first emerged in Europe and not in other 
world regions, technology is often referred to as a crucial factor. However, related cross-cultural 
comparisons still often focus on spectacular inventions and quantifiable performance alone and 
thus perpetuate Eurocentric categories. The present essay critically discusses this tendency 
of research. With regard to the issue of technical knowledge, it is proposed to investigate the 
multitude of aspects of expertise relevant for the realization of technology in any given world 
region rather than to pursue the traditional focus of the application of « science » to technical 
problems.
*. Marcus Popplow is head of the History department at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany. 
His research activities focus on the history of technology with special emphasis on the Middle Ages and 
the Early Modern period. His book Technik im Mittelalter was awarded the Conrad-Matschoß-Prize of 
the Association of German Engineers in 2013.
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Why did industrialization first emerge 
in Britain and thereupon in other 
European regions? Why not in other world 
regions like China, India and the Ottoman 
Empire? This issue is being debated in 
the social and historical sciences under 
the heading «  Why Europe1?  » Another 
label as frequently employed for this 
controversy is the «  great divergence  », 
coined by one of its protagonists, Kenneth 
Pomeranz, historian of China2. The notion 
« great divergence » conveys the idea that 
something unprecedented happened in 
world history towards the end of what 
historians of Europe call the early modern 
period. Until then, history on a global 
scale had repeatedly seen the rise and 
fall of mighty empires. Periods of « efflo-
rescence  » –  to use a term suggested by 
political scientist Jack Goldstone  – were 
followed by economic and cultural 
decline3. The path into industrialisation 
taken by some of Europe’s core regions 
and subsequently by the United States is 
seen in this view as a deviation from such 
continuous ups and downs, in a develop-
ment into a hitherto unparalleled conti-
nuity of economic growth. The «  great 
divergence  » thus highlights the unique-
ness of European and Western industriali-
zation, in contrast to the paths taken by all 
other cultures in world history.
But when exactly did Europe’s « spe-
cial course4  », which is another concept 
used to describe this same phenomenon, 
set in? There is yet no consensus on the 
answer to the question, or indeed if 
asking this question is a productive way 
of engaging the past, as will be explained 
in more detail later. Apart from the few 
who advocate its beginnings already 
during the European Middle Ages5, most 
agree, however, that this diverging path 
appeared sometime between 1500 and 
1800.
Technology as a crucial factor 
for the « great divergence »
In whichever field one seeks the clues 
for the question «  Why Europe?  », the 
reasons must be sought primarily in the 
early modern period. It is not the aim of 
this essay to present and discuss all the 
issues investigated by those involved in 
discussing this question in different sub-
field of history focusing on demography 
or economic institutions, religious beliefs 
or the availability of natural resources, 
factors such as the exploitation of 
colonies in the Americas and others. 
Economic historians, in particular, who 
are the most active participants in the 
debate, have identified a number of core 
issues, such as wage rates, agricultural 
productivity, or anthropometric mea-
sures for comparing standards of living 
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in regions of Europe, China, and India. 
Their considerations, based on extensive 
analysis of the relevant source material, 
will not be summarized here either, as 
recent detailed studies have presented 
the respective data6. Within the thematic 
framework of the present volume, the 
aim of this essay is rather to take a closer 
look at how «  technology  » enters and 
figures in this debate.
When authors discuss the whole 
bundle of possible factors that might 
have set England, in particular, on its 
way to industrialization, none can avoid 
mentioning technology. In the long run, 
machines too clearly appear as indispen-
sable factors for industrialization to be 
ignored. For the production of textiles, 
iron and steel, and many other goods; 
the steam engine as a power generator 
and the motor in locomotives that acce-
lerated transportation; and the shift to an 
energy system based on fossil fuels, later 
supplemented by electricity as a new 
form of easily available energy.
It would be a gross mistake, however, 
to identify the factor «  technology  » 
as a special characteristic of Europe or 
the West in the time period considered 
here. It is one of the central lessons 
of recent research on a global scale to 
have provided much detailed informa-
tion about technologies used in various 
world regions in pre-industrial times. 
The debate on the «  great divergence  » 
and respective cross-cultural compari-
sons usually focus predominantly on 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries. Somewhat implicitly, most authors 
thus agree that, towards the end of 
the European Middle Ages, Eurasian 
cultures were disposing over roughly 
comparable technological equipment 
and technical competences. At that 
point of time, it is argued, it would 
thus not have been possible to foresee 
which of them was better prepared for 
industrialization: Chinese regions had 
thriving economies and coal, ores and 
other resources in abundance. Zheng He 
had, just some decades earlier, success-
fully completed his famous exploratory 
voyages which even led him to the eas-
tern shores of Africa. Asian coastlines 
were dotted with smaller and larger 
harbours, which served to exchange a 
multitude of goods, among them pre-
cious wares like silk garments or Chinese 
porcelain, over large distances to the 
Arab peninsula –  in Europe, too, these 
luxuries were long being appreciated7. 
Textiles were produced all over Asia in 
great variety and number, and by refined 
techniques. In Arab regions, refined arti-
sanship and complex hydraulic systems 
formed the basis of intense commercial 
networks across Eurasia as well as far 
into Africa. It fits into this picture that, 
up to around 1500, Europe had been an 
importer of a wide array of technologies 
and goods from Asian regions as far as 
China: examples range from the compass 
to gunpowder and complex automata, 
silk and paper. In early modern Europe, 
authors were well aware of these ori-




Chronology and protagonists 
of the debate on the « great divergence »
Before looking in more detail at how 
early modern technology has been dis-
cussed in recent decades in the contro-
versy over the «  great divergence  », it 
might be appropriate to sketch briefly 
two of the central features of that debate. 
This section will survey how the debate 
unfolded over time and the academic 
profiles of its protagonists.
It is surely not new to compare dif-
ferences in economic performance of 
diverse high cultures in world his-
tory. Contemporaries of industrializa-
tion in the nineteenth century already 
highlighted European or «  Western  » 
superiority as part of colonial and often 
racist arguments, for example, in the 
context of the widely discussed pres-
entations of material culture on world 
fairs, starting with the famous exhi-
bition in London in 1851. As Michael 
Adas has shown, references to advanced 
technologies became more and more 
frequent among the arguments offered 
by nineteenth-century authors for the 
cultural dominance of the West9. In 
scientific discourse, authors in the early 
twentieth century like the German 
sociologist Max Weber discussed in 
detail different developmental paths of 
various regions of the world and sought 
cultural explanations for Europe’s par-
ticular path to industrialization. Much 
later, in the 1980s and 1990s, a growing 
awareness of globalization processes 
led to renewed interest in historical 
explanations for different develop-
mental paths taken by the various 
world regions. Since then, the centre of 
gravity of this debate has shifted away 
not unlike the swing of a pendulum. 
The first bestsellers included Eric Jones’ 
The European miracle (1981) and David 
Landes’ The wealth and poverty of nations 
(1998). Their authors supported the idea 
of Western dominance by often unduly 
clear-cut arguments10. A wealth of stu-
dies emerged in the rise of global his-
tory since the 1990s that pointed out the 
many blind spots in publications such 
as those by Jones and Landes. Now, 
they argued, it was urgently necessary 
not just to back the discussion about the 
« great divergence » with more solid data 
from economic history. In particular, the 
issues at stake must also be considered 
on the basis of well-informed research 
on Asian. The title of André Gunder 
Frank’s book, Re-Orient (1998), symbo-
lizes this approach well11. Particularly 
the « California school », named as such 
because its writers taught at Californian 
universities, synthesized studies speci-
fically on the economic history of pre-
modern China, to enable a more nuanced 
comparative analyses.
Despite all this contention, most of 
these debaters shared the conviction that 
Europe’s «  special course  » into indus-
trialization was to some extent contin-
gent. British industrialization is not seen 
as a necessary outcome of some parti-
cular characteristics that had evolved 
over centuries, but as a result that 
emerged somewhat arbitrarily out of a 
convergence of factors, among them the 
availability of coal and ores, the financial 
means to invest in large technological 
projects, and advanced forms of tech-
nical expertise.
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Most recently, this line of research 
followed by the «  California school  » 
is being supplemented by increasingly 
specialized studies of non-Western eco-
nomic development, providing a more 
solid basis for comparative studies12. 
Some core arguments of the California 
school have be questioned, most pro-
minently by the economic historian Peer 
Vries. He argues that during the early 
modern period Britain accumulated a 
wealth of factors on the economic level 
that allowed its transition to industriali-
zation whereas those possibilities were 
not available to China13. At first sight 
this position seems to mark the pendu-
lum’s swing back to the positions taken 
by Jones and Landes decades ago, albeit 
based on substantial amount of research 
results and data which became available 
since, in particular on Asian economies.
Even if the debate on the « great diver-
gence  » clearly has an interdisciplinary 
character, its most visible protagonists 
are economic historians and social scien-
tists with a historical interest. It would 
be hard to over emphasise that despite 
the large number of publications that 
in one way or another are contributing 
to the debate, many experts, particu-
larly those on non-Western cultures, are 
refraining from engaging in the debate 
even if tacitly, although their research 
experience is highly relevant to its core 
issues. There are surely good reasons 
for this choice: an inherent problem in 
the debate on the «  great divergence  » 
is that a presupposition of «  Western  » 
categories can hardly be avoided as 
its starting point –  most prominently, 
industrialization and economic growth 
as the crucial events seeking explana-
tion. Such Eurocentric presuppositions 
have, however, in principle long since 
been overcome in the large community 
of global historians. For many of them 
global history, by definition, must not 
presuppose «  Western  » categories, but 
must devise categories apt for the study 
of diverse world regions on an equal 
level. This position is connected with 
a more general suspicion concerning 
«  comparisons  » of regions or cultures 
as such – they have too often resulted in 
highlighting what « the West » had and 
what «  the Rest » did not have. As one 
of the ways out of this trap, it is usually 
proposed to focus instead on concrete 
interactions and networks, shifting the 
attention to processes of exchange and 
to personalities who served as brokers 
between cultures.
As convincing as this position is, one 
might also regret its consequences on the 
debate about the «  great divergence  ». 
The puzzling issue «  Why Europe?  » 
easily stirs interest and stimulates dis-
cussion in broader audiences of histo-
rical research among the well-informed 
public. It is thus somewhat deplorable 
when historians refrain from explicitly 
incorporating their positions into the 
controversy, even if they may have good 
reasons for taking a fundamentally cri-
tical stance on this debate as such. Such 
silence quite necessarily results in a lop-
sided assemblage of arguments and a 
lack of relevant issues in historical exper-
tise within the debate. As will be argued 
in what follows, a related problem also 
holds true for the factor of interest here, 
namely early modern technology.
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Ways to deal with the factor « technology » 
in the debate on the « great divergence »
As has already been stressed, tech-
nology is perceived as a crucial factor 
by nearly all the authors in the debate 
on the « great divergence ». They agree 
that it was by far the only aspect of rele-
vance to the development of sustained 
economic growth. It was, however, an 
indispensable one, insofar as without 
advanced machinery and the abun-
dant energy resources provided by 
fossil fuels, the rising output of goods, 
increase in productivity and drop in 
prices would not have been possible. 
This focus on quantifiable factors has, 
however, led to a somewhat lopsided 
treatment of technologies in the debate. 
Today, the history of technology is no 
longer seen predominantly as a history 
of spectacular inventions and innovation 
processes. Historians of technology pay 
attention to a whole range of other fac-
tors such as the social and cultural set-
tings in which diverse technologies are 
produced and used. The debate on the 
« great divergence » is still characterized 
by a much more schematic perspective 
on technology, however. One traditional 
strain compares the technologies of pre-
modern Europe, China, India, and the 
Ottoman Empire only in terms of who 
first invented what, the performance 
of certain artefacts or simply regarding 
sheer size, as is the case of comparing 
the ship sizes of Zheng He’s fleet with 
those of the European colonial powers. 
It has to be stressed that this focus is as 
characteristic of proponents of European 
superiority as well as of proponents of 
the superiority of Asian civilizations 
in the pre-industrial era. Just as Jones 
and Landes, repeatedly highlighted the 
superiority and ingenuity of Western 
technology, John Hobson, a most fervent 
advocate of Asian technological superio-
rity in the same period, used the same 
yardstick: innovation and large-scale 
technologies14. A second line of thought, 
as part of well-established approaches 
in economic history, stresses the role 
of technological artefacts in achieving 
productivity gains, for example as a res-
ponse by entrepreneurs to the high wage 
rates during British industrialization15. 
For example, one line of inquiry recently 
gaining momentum seeks to examine the 
role of macro- or micro-inventions in the 
productivity gains. To be sure, this is just 
one way of approaching the role of tech-
nology in a society. It is only one of a mul-
titude of issues nowadays under debate 
among historians with expertise in the 
history of technology, in particular when 
it comes to reflections about how socie-
ties employ and evaluate technologies.
The question is thus whether such 
a quantitative approach to the factor 
«  technology  » suffices to understand 
the role technology had in societies in 
China, India, the Ottoman Empire and 
European’s core regions between c. 1500 
and c. 1800 and the relevance this factor 
thus might have had to the « great diver-
gence  ». One might well argue that a 
merely quantitative perception of the 
issue of technology rather obstructs a 
more substantial discussion of the qua-
litative aspects of this factor. Along this 
line of thought, the discussion about 
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technological issues in the controversy 
on the « great divergence » could in the 
future be brought to a different level. 
One could, for example, explicitly turn 
away from comparing the mere perfor-
mance of technical artefacts and from 
using yardsticks like efficiency and pro-
ductivity gains, in order to develop non-
Eurocentric categories instead which 
might better serve to compare techno-
logies in different world regions. Such 
categories might comprise the ways 
technologies were adopted and adapted 
to local economic, social, and envi-
ronmental conditions; how respective 
decisions were influenced by political 
or religious structures; and which sym-
bolic functions such artefacts had as part 
of the material culture of a given place 
or region. So far, however, a discussion 
about the standards by which one might 
compare pre-industrial technologies in 
different regions of the world with such 
rather qualitative categories has hardly 
even begun16.
One thing quite clear is that utiliza-
tion of the most intricate machinery 
is not an appropriate yardstick of our 
reflection on the ways technology is part 
and parcel of a change over time in any 
society. An often cited example of the 
problems connected to this frequently 
adopted approach is the employment of 
milling machinery in Europe and China. 
While the basic elements of this techno-
logy had been known in both cultures 
since about the time of Christ’s birth, 
and various forms of mills were being 
employed for various purposes in China 
for centuries, China did not experience a 
similar application density of grain mills 
as did Europe, where mills were found 
in a range of places throughout the early 
modern period. One of the basic rea-
sons is that, in China, the milling of rice 
was simply not necessary or adequate. 
All the same, when it comes to agrarian 
output, Chinese rice farming produced 
more calories per area than European 
grain production. To use the number of 
mills employed as a yardstick for techno-
logical superiority is thus as misleading. 
Similarly misleading is the argument 
that the renunciation of carts in Arab 
regions since late Antiquity in favor of 
camels marks a technological regression 
in transportation. Research has shown 
that because the climatic and environ-
mental circumstances in which they 
technical choice was made, camels were 
simply much more apt to fulfil transpor-
tation purposes than carts.
Another such doubtful comparison 
regards the employment of complex 
pumping technology for irrigation 
purposes as a symbol of technological 
progress. Hydraulic systems such as 
those in China or in the Islamic world and 
Persia, to a great extent without relying 
on such mechanical devices, fulfilled 
comparable functions and were some-
times executed on a considerably larger 
scale than their European counterparts.
To be sure, mechanical technology 
remains highly relevant to the study of 
Western industrialization. Yet the argu-
ment advanced here is that it would 
be productive to discuss pre-industrial 
technology on a global scale without 
necessarily presupposing Eurocentric 
categories. There is surely enough mate-
rial to do so. In recent years a number of 
pioneering studies have been published 
that take a closer look at Ottoman arti-
sans, cotton production in Asian regions, 
the employment of gunpowder wea-
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pons across Asia, or the employment of 
technical and scientific illustrations and 
technical treatises in China17. However, 
these path-breaking studies seem to 
have not been taken comprehensively 
into account in scholarship on the « great 
divergence ». An attempt to take a closer 
look at «  technology  », below the only 
skin-deep quantitative approaches, 
could also be directed at the study of 
technical knowledge, along the lines dis-
cussed in the following section.
Applied science or technical knowledge?
Interestingly, «  science  » is only 
rarely discussed as a relevant factor 
in the debate over the «  great diver-
gence  ». By now, there seems to be an 
agreement that major achievements in 
the natural sciences in Europe, even 
those by such outstanding characters 
as Galileo and Newton, did not directly 
influence technological achievements in 
the early stages of the industrial revo-
lution and are thus not of relevance to 
Europe’s « special course ». This aspect is 
connected to the insight that technology 
in the early modern period and, as many 
researchers now argue, even far into the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, was 
definitely not some kind of «  applied 
science ». Therefore it cannot be said that 
scientific reasoning was in some way 
«  adapted  » to technological needs and 
thus helped to realize artefacts, proce-
dures or machines that artisanship alone 
would not have succeeded in produ-
cing. To be sure, many technical experts 
in early modern Europe increasingly 
attempted to analyse pressing technical 
problems with mathematical and geo-
metrical tools, in particular in civil and 
military engineering. In the overwhel-
ming majority of cases, however, they 
succeeded in describing in mathema-
tical language what they had perceived 
before, rather than developing new tech-
nical solutions on the basis of scientific 
reasoning. For the debate on the « great 
divergence », it is quite clear that it was 
definitely not scientific reasoning that 
put early modern Britain on the path 
toward industrialization.
This, however, does not mean that 
far-reaching transformations of tech-
nical expertise during the early modern 
period were irrelevant to technological 
change right from the start. Much better 
than describing these transformations in 
terms of (applied) science, they might be 
described as a whole set of interrelated 
developments that resulted in the fact 
that technical knowledge was no longer 
nearly exclusively embodied in an 
artisan, in the form of personal expertise 
accumulated over the course of years or 
decades. Since the late Middle Ages, in 
addition to that common form of exper-
tise, representational media such as tech-
nical drawings and treatises had become 
part of standard practice. Towards the 
end of the early modern period, such 
formalized technical knowledge was 
collected, discussed, and taught in ins-
titutions such as scientific academies, 
economic societies, and engineering 
schools18.
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To what extent this development which 
indeed influenced technical practice in 
early industrialization is still a matter of 
debate. However, it seems evident that, it 
was related to practices like the usage of 
scaled-down models and measuring ins-
truments in engineering, to field trials in 
agriculture, to learned correspondence, 
and to privileges for inventions, patents, 
and prize contests. Authors including 
Joel Mokyr and Margret Jacob have 
recently identified this cluster of media, 
institutions and practices, with regard 
to the eighteenth century, as part of an 
«  industrial enlightenment  », to which 
they attach considerable relevance to the 
onset of British industrialization19; Other 
authors have questioned the top-down 
approach inherent in this argument and 
have opted for a broader analysis of 
technical knowledge that does more jus-
tice to a broad array of various forms of 
artisanal knowledge that undoubtedly 
produced viable economic effects in 
early modern Europe20.
Conclusion
For future studies on the «  great 
divergence  », this shift of focus from 
highlighting «  science  » as a factor of 
cross-cultural comparisons to investiga-
ting instead various bodies of formalized 
knowledge in different parts of the world 
fits well into more recent developments 
in a global history of science. Studies that 
explore –  even without directly contri-
bute – to the issue of the « great diver-
gence » tend to look at « science » from 
the perspective of the « natural sciences » 
according to European standards, to an 
encompassing variety of bodies of for-
malized knowledge21. Such approaches 
converge well with recent trends in stu-
dies at the intersection of early modern 
history of science and history of techno-
logy in Europe that increasingly tend to 
overcome this binary opposition with 
the aim rather of writing an overarching 
history of expertise in that period22.
Due to their somewhat restricted 
focus on technological invention alone, 
the protagonists of the debate on the 
«  great divergence  » thus far have 
not taken much note of these trans-
formations of early modern technical 
knowledge. A research project headed by 
Patrick O’Brien at the London School of 
Economics mainly introduced this pers-
pective into reflections on the «  great 
divergence » by studying the generation 
and application of « useful and reliable 
knowledge  » in various world regions 
before the onset of industrialization. 
Karel Davids, in his recent contribution 
to the debate, has discussed the rela-
tion between religion and technology 
in pre-modern Europe and China, with 
extensive reference to such newer metho-
dological approaches23. He thus demons-
trated that an in-depth consideration of 
these media, institutions and practices 
is one of many possibilities to bring the 
discussion of technology in this contro-
versy to a level transcending its study as 




The «  cultural turn  » that the history 
of technology as a historical sub-disci-
pline has witnessed in recent years offers 
many such possibilities for the study of 
how societies in various world regions 
not only employed technologies as an 
economically relevant factor, but also as 
an inherent part of their material culture 
within which technology served a multi-
tude of cultural and symbolic functions. 
The study of technical knowledge, in this 
panorama, shifts the focus away from 
some sort of « applied science » toward 
studying the wealth of knowledge forma-
tions that characterized, in particular, the 
expertise with which artisans produced 
viable economic effects in all regions 
of the world. Historians of science and 
technology might profit from future 
insights into an extended study of these 
levels of the « great divergence » to the 
same extent as representatives of other 
scientific disciplines and the interested 
public.
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